This paper integrates a …nancial accelerator mechanism à la Bernanke et al. (1999) and time-varying uncertainty into a Dynamic New Keynesian model. We examine the extent to which uncertainty and credit conditions interact with one another. The idea is that uncertainty aggravates the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, and worsens credit conditions. Already poor credit conditions amplify the e¤ect of shocks (to both the mean and variance) on the aggregate economy. In our model, uncertainty modelled as time-varying stochastic volatility emerges from monetary policy (policy uncertainty), …nancial risks (micro-uncertainty), and the aggregate state of the economy (macrouncertainty). Using a third order approximation, we …nd that micro-uncertainty has …rst order e¤ects on economic activity through its direct impact on credit conditions. We also …nd that if credit conditions (as measured by the endogenous risk spread) are already poor, then additional micro-uncertainty shocks have even larger real e¤ects. In turn, shocks to aggregate uncertainty (macro-and policy-uncertainty) have relatively small direct e¤ects on aggregate economic activity.
Introduction
In the latter part of the 2000s, the U.S. economy experienced its longest recession in the post-World War II period. The unique character of this recession has sparked a renewed interest in the role of two important ampli…cation mechanisms: credit market frictions and uncertainty. Baseline models that were popular and commonly used for policy analysis prior to the recession often feature frictionless capital markets (Christiano et al. (2005) , Smets and Wouters (2007) ), but even in ‡uential models with …nancial frictions (Bernanke et al. (1999) , , Martínez-García (2014) ) or with uncertainty (Bloom (2009) ) have yet to explore the adverse feedback loop that can arise from increased borrowing spreads during periods of heightened uncertainty.
We introduce aggregate, policy, and …nancial uncertainty into a New Keynesian framework with capital accumulation …nanced through risky nominal loans subject to endogenous default. We argue that our framework not only explains the observed credit spreads in a model with production, but also improves upon the canonical stochastic general equilibrium business cycle model. Credit market spreads, re ‡ecting the di¤erence between borrowing rates and the return on savings, a¤ect the cost of capital in our model. This, in turn, a¤ects the real economy and leads to a strong correlation between credit spreads and aggregate quantities. The Great Recession of 2008-2009 o¤ers a primary example of the important role that ‡uctuations in credit risk play in the aggregate economy. Unfortunately these developments also exposed the current need for new state-of-the-art models suitable for understanding the joint behavior of credit risk, asset prices, and the key macroeconomic aggregates in a production economy.
One interpretation of …nancial market imperfections stems from the information asymmetry and/or costly contract enforcement that characterizes credit markets. This gives rise to agency costs that are incorporated in …nancial contracts that link borrowers and lenders. The strand of research which focuses on this credit channel highlights the e¤ect of credit frictions in propagating cyclical movements of real economic activity (Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Bernanke et al. (1996) , Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , Bernanke et al. (1999) ), and how those credit frictions a¤ect monetary policy-making (Carlstrom et al. (2009) , , Gilchrist et al. (2013) , Christiano et al. (2014) 
At a general level, uncertainty is de…ned as the conditional volatility of a disturbance that is unforecastable from the perspective of economic agents. Research which focuses on the role of time-varying uncertainty or time-varying second-moments has also attracted much attention. In partial equilibrium settings, increases in uncertainty can depress investment, employment, and consumption if agents are subject to …xed costs or partial irreversibility (a real options e¤ect), if agents are risk averse (a precautionary savings e¤ect) or if …nancial constraints tighten in response to higher uncertainty (a …nancial frictions or asset pricing e¤ect). In general equilibrium settings, many of these mechanisms continue to imply a role for time-varying uncertainty, although some of these e¤ects may get attenuated when the general equilibrium e¤ects are introduced.
Typically, uncertainty, which arises independently of economic and policy shocks, delays investment by changing investor sentiments and enhances the option value of waiting (see the investment under uncertainty literature-e.g., Bernanke (1983) and Pindyck (1988) ). It also strengthens the precautionary saving motive of economic agents. A shock to time-varying uncertainty has been shown to have e¤ects on consumption, output, and investment decisions (Dorofeenko et al. (2008) , Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009) , Bloom (2009 , Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) , Bloom et al. (2014) , Basu and Bundick (2014) , Cesa-Bianchi and Fernández-Corugedo (2014) , Born and Pfeifer (2014) ). 1 In this paper, we examine the relationship between credit frictions and uncertainty and the role the interaction these can have in generating ‡uctuations in output, risk spreads, and other macroeconomic variables. We consider three types of uncertainty. Macro-uncertainty represents uncertainty about the evolution of the economy brought about by time-varying volatility of innovations in total factor productivity (TFP). Micro-uncertainty in our model is the dispersion in the distribution of the idiosyncratic technology shock of the entrepreneurs and represents the idiosyncratic uncertainty about the evolution of individual …rms'productivity. This uncertainty plays a key role in the genesis of the …nancial frictions. Finally, policy uncertainty is re ‡ected in a variance of innovations to the monetary rule that varies over time. Our primary interest is to examine how these three types of uncertainty interact with one another and the credit frictions brought about by asymmetric information and costly state veri…cation.
Formally, we integrate a model of agency cost à la Bernanke et al. (1999) with the three types of timevarying uncertainty into an otherwise standard Dynamic New Keynesian model. Entrepreneurs seek external funds to …nance the acquisition of tomorrow's stock of capital. The riskiness of the acquisition is due to an idiosyncratic technology shock that can only be observed by the entrepreneurs costlessly. Hence, lenders must resort to costly monitoring of the outcome of the risky projects in order to dissuade the entrepreneurs from misreporting their net revenues. The cost of this monitoring process, the agency cost, is a constant fraction of the value of the assets of the entrepreneur (the value of the stock of capital). This agency cost gives rise to the external …nance premium required by the lenders and, therefore, raises the costs of borrowing. Uncertainty about entrepreneur productivity gets priced into the external …nance premium that entrepreneurs must pay to the …nancial intermediaries in order to borrow. Therefore, shocks in the dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity (or micro-uncertainty) are essentially a source of exogenous ‡uctuations in the external …nance premium. Changes in micro-uncertainty provide an additional source of shocks that o¤set the relatively small quantitative ampli…cation that credit frictions appear to have for standard macro shocks (Kocherlakota (2000) , Córdoba and Ripoll (2004) ).
In addition, we consider the degree to which aggregate and policy uncertainty interact with credit frictions through their e¤ect on entrepreneur net worth. First, we consider …nancial contracts that are written in nominal rather than real terms. This raises the possibility that uncertainty shocks that make in ‡ation uncertain will increase the risk about the real payo¤ of the nominal loan contract. Second, uncertainty (both macro and policy) through their e¤ects on the discounting of future payo¤s on investment projects can a¤ect the price of capital.
2 Changes in the price of capital, in turn, can a¤ect entrepreneur net worth which also plays a role in determining the extent of the credit frictions (as measured by the external …nance premium).
We model time-varying uncertainty using stochastic volatility models (as in Fernández-Villaverde (2010) , Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010) , Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) , and Born and Pfeifer (2014) ). First and second order approximations are not well suited to account for time-varying uncertainty Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) ). 3 We solve the model using a third-order 1 Changes in uncertainty in these models provide an additional source of shocks. In Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009 ), Bloom (2009 ), and Bloom et al. (2014 this uncertainty is the time-varying variance of TFP shocks). Basu and Bundick (2014) include TFP and preference (discount factor) uncertainty shocks. Born and Pfeifer (2014) add monetary and …scal policy uncertainty as do Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) .
2 For example, Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal (2007) examine the e¤ect of long-run uncertainty about cash ‡ows on asset prices.
3 See Schmitt- Grohé and Uribe (2004) , Fernández-Villaverde (2010) , Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010) , and more recently approximation, which allows for a richer exploration of nonlinear relationships between credit frictions, uncertainty, and economic activity than a second-order approximation. We exploit this potential nonlinearity by conducting impulse response analysis that is conditional on the initial state of the economy at the time of the shock. In particular, we consider whether the e¤ects of shocks are conditional on the degree of uncertainty and size of the credit frictions. This allows us to examine whether shocks have di¤erent qualitative e¤ects depending on the current state of credit frictions or current degree of uncertainty. That is to say, we ask whether uncertainty, aside from being a source of shocks, ampli…es the e¤ects of possibly unrelated shocks.
We …nd that shocks to micro-uncertainty (or, equivalently, exogenous credit friction shocks) have …rst-order e¤ects that are of similar magnitudes as shocks to the level of TFP or a traditional monetary policy shock. The response of our model economies to the micro-uncertainty shock appears to be similar to a typical …nancial …ctions shock: There is a decline in investment and production along with a signi…cant decline in labor use. On the other hand, TFP uncertainty shocks, on average, have e¤ects that are orders of magnitude smaller than level TFP or micro-uncertainty shocks. Monetary policy uncertainty shocks also have e¤ects that are substantially smaller than shocks to the level of TFP or monetary policy. However, monetary policy uncertainty has larger e¤ects than TFP uncertainty on the dynamics of the economy. We …nd that the degree to which monetary policy uncertainty matters depends on the extent of nominal rigidities in the model. We …nd mixed results regarding whether or not the state of credit conditions (measured by credit spreads) ampli…es other shocks. Large initial spreads tend to slightly dampen the e¤ect on output of TFP shocks while slightly amplifying that of monetary shocks. However, if spreads are already high, the e¤ect of microuncertainty shocks on output is nearly 40% larger than when spreads are low. This suggests that when credit conditions are poor (high spreads), additional credit shocks make the situation disproportionately worse. On the other hand, conditioning on the amount of TFP or monetary uncertainty has virtually no qualitative e¤ect on the responses to shocks in the model aside from the fact that shocks tend to be larger when uncertainty is higher.
While other literature has examined the impact of uncertainty on economic ‡uctuations, our paper di¤ers from this previous literature in a few key respects. Like us, Gilchrist et al. (2013) and Christiano et al. (2014) include both credit frictions and uncertainty. In their models, the source of the time-varying uncertainty was changes in the distribution of entrepreneur productivity. The heterogeneity of entrepreneur productivity is the underlying source of the information asymmetry that is responsible for the credit frictions. Christiano et al. (2014) show that this idiosyncratic uncertainty acts as an additional source of shocks and these shocks play an important role in generating aggregate ‡uctuations. Gilchrist et al. (2013) also …nd that the combination of micro-uncertainty and credit frictions can be important for aggregate ‡uctuations and argue that this combination is quantitatively more important than the combination of micro-uncertainty and irreversibility (option value of waiting e¤ ect). Neither paper explores the interaction of credit frictions with other sources of uncertainty and how the various forms of uncertainty interact with one another, nor do they explore the possible non-linearity implied by the model. Furthermore, while there have been a few papers that examine how zero lower bound monetary policy interacts with aggregate uncertainty (Basu and Bundick (2014) ), policy uncertainty (Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) ), and micro-uncertainty (Gilchrist et al. (2013) ), little other work has really explored the implications of the nonlinearity implied by both stochastic volatility and the costly-state veri…cation credit frictions. Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion of the relative merits of alternative approximations.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our model with credit market imperfections and micro-uncertainty, macro-uncertainty, and policy uncertainty, while Section 3 discusses the interaction between credit frictions and uncertainty. Section 4 introduces the perturbation approach that we use to compute a third-order approximation and summarizes the parameterization strategy used for the simulations. Section 5 highlights the main quantitative …ndings derived from our analysis of the model.
Section 6 provides a discussion of the main …ndings of this paper and the literature, and Section 7 concludes.
General equilibrium conditions, the zero-in ‡ation steady state, and all listed tables and …gures are provided in the Appendix.
2 Credit Frictions and Uncertainty
We extend the benchmark New Keynesian business cycle model with uncertainty modelled as in Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) and a …nancial accelerator mechanism based on the costly-state veri…cation framework of Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) . 5 The central bank's actions in our framework are described with a modi…ed Taylor (1993)-type rule for monetary policy augmented with time-varying stochastic volatility in the monetary shock process. In this way, we capture policy uncertainty in conjunction with the …nancial distortions introduced by the costly monitoring of nominal …nancial contracts.
We distinguish here between idiosyncratic and aggregate technology shocks to productivity whereby the given …nancial distortion is ine¢ cient because it prevents economic agents from fully insuring themselves against all idiosyncratic risk. Stochastic volatility on the idiosyncratic technology shocks to capital returns is introduced to model micro-uncertainty; but our model still retains aggregate productivity (TFP) shocks with a stochastic volatility component to incorporate macro-uncertainty and keep our analysis comparable with the current literature. The remainder of this section describes the building blocks of the model in more detail and further elaborates on our extensions of the benchmark New Keynesian model.
Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of mass one of identical and in…nitely-lived households. Preferences are de…ned over per capita consumption, C t , and per capita labor, H t , based on an additively separable speci…cation with internal habits in consumption:
where 0 < < 1 is the intertemporal discount factor, 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, 0 governs the relative disutility 4 Additional technical details on the estimation and simulation of the model as well as a richer set of experiments used to evaluate the implications of the model can be found in Balke et al. (2017) . 5 Other references based on the costly-state veri…cation framework include Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Bernanke et al. (1999) , Cohen-Cole and Martínez-García (2010) , Martínez-García (2014), and Christiano et al. (2014) , among others. of labor e¤ort, and 0 b 1 de…nes the internal habit persistence on consumption. 6 Households face the following nominal budget constraint:
At time t, households consume an amount C t of the …nal good at price P t and save an amount B t through one-period deposits o¤ered by the …nancial intermediaries maturing at time t+1. 7 Households receive a gross nominal risk-free interest rate I t 1 on their deposits maturing at time t (B t 1 ), earn income from supplying labor H t at the prevailing competitive nominal wage rate W t , and receive nominal dividend payments DIV t from the pro…ts or losses generated by the …nancial and non…nancial …rms they own.
Solving the households' optimization problem, we obtain the following labor supply equation and the following Euler equation for the consumption-savings decision:
where
i denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the households' budget constraint expressed in units of the …nal good. The households'equilibrium conditions are completed with the appropriate initial and no-Ponzi transversality conditions.
Entrepreneurs and Financial Business Sector
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs of unit mass with identical linear preferences de…ned over per capita
where the parameter 0 < < 1 scaling the intertemporal discount factor in (5) captures the probability of each entrepreneur surviving until the next period. 8 The mass of entrepreneurs in each period is kept constant and equal to one by assuming full replacement of the entrepreneurial deaths.
The entrepreneurs who survive purchase raw capital from a group of capital producers, transform the raw capital into work capital services, and rent them to wholesale producers who produce wholesale goods (intermediate goods). The purchase of raw capital is …nanced internally and possibly externally with a loan contract between a living entrepreneur and a …nancial intermediary. The living entrepreneurs also supply labor to the wholesale producers. The entrepreneurs who die in period t do not purchase capital, work, or sign new contracts, but instead simply consume their accumulated net worth and disappear. The new entrepreneurs that replace them come with no net worth, but get some entrepreneurial labor income to start.
Entrepreneurs and the Agency Cost
At time t 1, entrepreneurs purchase from capital producers the aggregate stock of capital necessary for production at time t, K t , at a price per unit Q t 1 in terms of the …nal good. The total nominal value of the capital acquisition, P t 1 Q t 1 K t , is …nanced with a combination of the entrepreneurs' accumulated nominal net worth (internal funds), N t 1 , and external funding provided by the …nancial intermediaries (via one-period risky loans), Pt + Q t (1 )
with t Pt Pt 1 being the in ‡ation rate on …nal goods.
The idiosyncratic technology shock ! t is log-normally distributed-i.e., ln(! t ) N ( !;t ; 2 !;t ). The variance, 2 !;t , re ‡ects the dispersion of the cross-section distribution of entrepreneur productivity and, hence, the micro-uncertainty underlying the credit frictions. We allow this variance to be time-varying. Speci…cally, !;t ! e b !;t where b !;t ln !;t ln ! ) and
where u !;t is i.i.d. N (0; 1). The parameter 0 < ! < 1 determines the persistence of the idiosyncratic technology shock's log-volatility b !;t . The unconditional expected volatility is given by ! > 0, while ! 0 controls the standard deviation of the innovation to the stochastic volatility process. Furthermore, the distribution is mean-preserving to isolate the e¤ects of pure second moment shocks (micro-uncertainty) from the …rst moment or level e¤ects of the shock. 9 To do this, we set the time-varying conditional mean !;t to be !;t = 2 !;t 2 ensuring the unconditional mean of the idiosyncratic technology shock is equal to one (i.e., E (! t ) = e !;t+ 2 !;t 2 = 1).
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The idiosyncratic technology shock ! t 1 is costlessly observable to the entrepreneurs only after the loan terms are agreed upon, while monitoring is costly for the …nancial intermediaries-the …nancial friction in our model arises from this informational asymmetry.
11 Under limited liability, in case of default at time t, the …nancial intermediaries can only appropriate the nominal capital income generated by the defaulting entrepreneur in that period-which amounts in total to ! t 1 R w t + P t Q t (1 ) K t = ! t 1 R e t P t 1 Q t 1 K t . Financial intermediaries monitor and verify the defaulting entrepreneur's income at a cost expressed as a fraction 0 < 1 of the nominal amount recovered-i.e., at a nominal cost of ! t 1 R e t P t 1 Q t 1 K t . At time t, default on a loan occurs whenever the nominal income earned by the defaulting entrepreneur after the realization of the idiosyncratic technology shock ! t 1 is insu¢ cient to cover the nominal repayment expenses on the loan, i.e., whenever
where R L t denotes the nominal borrowing cost set by the …nancial intermediaries. A risky one-period loan (L t 1 ) is simply de…ned in terms of a default threshold on the idiosyncratic technology shock, ! t 1 , for which the loan repayment exactly equals the capital income accrued-i.e., R
In case of default (! t 1 < ! t 1 ), the …nancial intermediaries always choose to monitor in order to prevent the defaulting entrepreneur from misreporting the true value of ! t 1 and, therefore, the nominal income that can be recovered. The entrepreneur that defaults gets nothing, while the …nancial intermediaries are able to recover
(1 ) ! t 1 R e t P t 1 Q t 1 K t net of monitoring costs. If the entrepreneur does not default (! t 1 ! t 1 ), then he pays ! t 1 R e t P t 1 Q t 1 K t back to the …nancial intermediaries and keeps (! t 1 ! t 1 ) R e t P t 1 Q t 1 K t for himself.
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Apart from capital income net of borrowing costs, entrepreneurs get revenue also from inelastically supplying one unit of entrepreneurial labor-i.e., H e t = 1-to the wholesale producers at the competitive nominal wage, W e t . Hence, the budget constraint of the entrepreneurs can be described in the following 9 The literature has traditionally introduced stochastic volatility on log-normally distributed shocks-hence, shocks to volatility not only a¤ect the dispersion of the shock distribution (second moment e¤ect), but also change its conditional mean (…rst moment e¤ect), potentially confounding the impact of the shock. Introducing mean-preserving volatility shocks as we do in the paper allows us to more cleanly disentangle the e¤ect of these shocks. See the Appendix for a more detailed description of the mean-preserving uncertainty shocks.
1 0 Given the fact that the random shock !t is i.i.d., the conditional and unconditional means are equivalent in this case. 1 1 The costly acquisition of information about these idionsyncratic shocks implies that …nancial contracts cannot be written down to completely diversify away these risks. We extend the work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Bernanke et al. (1999) , Cohen-Cole and Martínez-García (2010) , and Martínez-García (2014)-based on the costly-state veri…cation set-up of Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) -to express …nancial contracts in nominal terms. With a nominal …nancial contract, risks that a¤ect in ‡ation can also in ‡uence the allocation of capital.
1 2 Whenever there is aggregate risk, R e t is not known at time t 1 when the loan is …nalized. Bernanke et al. (1999) appeal to the assumption that entrepreneurs are risk-neutral while households are risk-averse to argue that loan contracts should require the entrepreneurs to bear all the aggregate risk to provide full insurance for the households' savings allocated by the …nancial intermediaries. However, loan contracts with full insurance for the savers are not necessarily optimal in more general settings (see, e.g., Hellwig (2001) , Monnet and Quintin (2005) , and Carlstrom et al. (2016) , among others). We leave the exploration of more complex risk-sharing …nancial arrangements for future research.
generic terms:
where the nominal income stream from capital and labor plus the amount borrowed from the …nancial intermediaries (L t ) are allocated to entrepreneurial consumption (C e t ) and for the acquisition of tomorrow's capital stock (K t+1 ). The objective of the entrepreneurs is to maximize their lifetime utility in (5) subject to the canonical sequence of budget constraints described in (9) and the entrepreneurs'balance sheet identity
Optimal Loan Contract (Signed in Time Period t)
There is a continuum of identical, competitive …nancial intermediaries of unit mass. At each time period t, …nancial intermediaries o¤er one-period, fully-insured deposits to households for saving purposes and pay a gross risk-free rate, I t (which is known at time t). These …nancial intermediaries capture all households' savings through deposits to o¤er one-period loans to the entrepreneurs. As explained in the Appendix, the loan contracting problem reduces to optimally choosing the quantity of capital, K t+1 , and the threshold, ! t , that maximizes the entrepreneurs'nominal return on capital net of the borrowing costs
subject to a participation constraint for the lenders (…nancial intermediaries)
where f (! t ; !;t ) and g (! t ; !;t ) denote the share of capital income going to the entrepreneurs and the …nancial intermediaries, respectively. The participation constraint simply requires …nancial intermediaries to be su¢ ciently compensated on their loans to pay back the depositors in full.
Solving the loan contract problem results in three key equilibrium conditions. First, the sharing rule between entrepreneurs and …nancial intermediaries resulting from the optimal loan contract implies that
where G (! t ; !;t ) determines the monitoring losses associated with default. 13 Second, we …nd that
where (! t ; !;t ) is the Lagrange multiplier on the participation constraint in (11) (which represents the shadow cost of enticing the participation of the …nancial intermediaries). Hence, the default threshold ! t depends on the dispersion of the idiosyncratic technology shock (our measure of micro-uncertainty), !;t , and on the asset-to-net-worth ratio of the entrepreneurs, PtQtKt+1 Nt . 14 Finally, expected gross returns to entrepreneurs are:
where s
PtQtKt+1 Nt
; !;t is the external …nance premium, which is a function of the micro-uncertainty shock, !;t , and the asset-to-net-worth ratio,
, of the entrepreneurs.
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If the …nancial sector makes losses in equilibrium, then the participation constraint would be violated.
If the …nancial sector makes pro…ts, then the entrepreneurs would be better o¤ with another loan contract that still satis…es the participation constraint of the …nancial intermediaries but with lower borrowing rates.
Thus, the optimal external …nance premium must allow …nancial intermediaries to recover enough income to repay their depositors in full every period from the pool of loans while breaking even (zero pro…ts on their portfolio of loans in equilibrium). Therefore, external funding (loans) is always more expensive for entrepreneurs than internal funding (net worth) whose opportunity cost is given by the nominal risk-free rate I t paid on deposits.
Entrepreneurs'Consumption and Net Worth under the Optimal Loan Contract
In equilibrium, whenever the optimal loan contract is implemented, the entrepreneurs'budget constraint in (9) de…nes an upper bound on entrepreneurial net worth N t as follows:
given the optimality condition in (13). Each entrepreneur dies with probability (1 ) and gets replaced by a new entrepreneur with no net worth-hence, preventing the entrepreneurs from accumulating in…nite wealth and becoming self-…nancing. Moreover, entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and relatively more impatient than households given (5), so they choose to postpone their consumption until they die.
Hence, it follows from equation (16) that the aggregate consumption for entrepreneurs, C e t , can be expressed as
given that only the entrepreneurs who die consume at time t. 16 Furthermore, the law of motion for nominal 1 4 The asset-to-net-worth ratio can be related to the leverage ratio since
is a conventional measure of debt-to-net worth.
1 5 The characterization of the external …nancing premium s
; !;t is discussed in further detail in the Appendix. 1 6 We interpret net worth, like capital, as accumulated output. Entrepreneurial consumption is just the fraction of that accumulated output that corresponds to the dying entrepreneurs. Hence, entrepreneurial consumption does not detract resources from current production of …nal goods. entrepreneurial net worth, N t , follows from equation (16) as
This means that the net worth of the entrepreneurs above, beyond their per-period entrepreneurial labor income, is given by the income the survived entrepreneurs (with a fraction of ) earn from their capital purchases net of borrowing costs.
Non-Financial Business Sector 2.3.1 Capital Producers
There is a continuum of mass one of identical capital-producing …rms. The aggregate stock of capital K t evolves according to the following law of motion:
where X t denotes aggregate investment in terms of the …nal good. The production of physical capital is subject to adjustment costs as in Hayashi (1982) -and here we adopt the adjustment cost function speci…cation proposed by Jermann (1998) and Boldrin et al. (2001) , i.e.,
where ' k > 0 regulates the degree of concavity and
Xt
Kt denotes the investment-to-capital ratio. We impose the restrictions s k ( ) = and s 0 k ( ) = 1 to ensure that adjustment costs drop out in steady state, setting the constants s k1 and s k2 to be s k1 ( )
At time t, entrepreneurs purchase their desired capital stock for the next period of time, K t+1 ; from the capital producers, and sell them back the depreciated stock of existing capital (1 ) K t after the production of wholesale goods is done. Capital producers also purchase …nal goods in the amount of X t at P t to produce s k Xt Kt K t units of new capital. Hence, the per-period (static) pro…ts of the capital producers are given by P t Q t K t+1 X t (1 ) Q t K t , which they aim to maximize subject to (19). Solving the capital producers'optimization, the relative price of new capital in terms of the …nal good (or Tobin's q) Q t is given by:
where the parameter ' k governs the elasticity of investment with respect to Tobin's q. 18 Note that the 1 7 The adjustment cost function s k
, and s 00 k ( ) < 0. 1 8 Time-variation in the relative price of capital serves as an additional ampli…cation and propagation mechanism in this framework. We follow Bernanke et al. (1999) giving ownership of the capital-producing sector to households in order to ensure that capital production decisions are not directly a¤ecting the entrepreneurs'decision on how much capital to demand. resale value of the depreciated stock of capital Q t di¤ers from the Tobin's q Q t set by the capital producers.
Imposing that these producers break even making zero pro…ts, i.e.,
we pin down the relative resale value of capital Q t as a function of Q t and the investment-to-capital ratio ( Xt Kt ). Note that the di¤erence between Q t and Q t is of second-order importance and omitted by Bernanke et al. (1999) which rely on a …rst-order approximation to characterize the dynamics of their model. We cannot ignore the distinction in our set-up, as we solve our model up to a higher order of approximation.
Wholesale Firms
There is a continuum of mass one of identical wholesale producers. Wholesale goods, Y w t , are produced with the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
combining labor from households, H t , labor from entrepreneurs, H e t , and rented capital, K t , owned by the entrepreneurs. Both capital share, , and entrepreneurial labor share, #, are elements of [0; 1], and they give rise to the household labor share, (1 #).
With persistence a 2 (0; 1); the stochastic process for aggregate productivity (TFP), a t , is given by:
Similar to the micro-uncertainty shock, a macro-uncertainty shock is de…ned as a shock to the stochastic volatility in the TFP, a;t a e b a;t , where a > 0, and
with 0 < a < 1 and a 0: Note that " a;t and u a;t are i.i.d. N (0; 1) and uncorrelated. The shock " a;t raises the productivity level (…rst moment shock), while u a;t introduces a shock to its volatility (second moment shock).
To isolate the e¤ects of the pure second moment shocks (macro-uncertainty) from the …rst moment TFP shock, we de…ne a mean-preserving shock process by requiring the time-varying conditional mean, a;t , to satisfy the following recursion: a;t = 2 a;t 2 + 2 a a;t 1 . 19 The unconditional mean of the process a can then be expressed as a
All wholesale producers operate in competitive markets and produce a homogeneous good sold only to retailers. Solving the (static) pro…t-maximization problem of the wholesale producers subject to the technological constraint implied by the production function in (23) results in the factors of production being remunerated at their marginal product,
where labor from households and entrepreneurs is paid at competitive nominal wages, W t and W e t respectively, rented capital from the entrepreneurs is compensated with a nominal rental rate, R w t , and the relative price of the wholesale good in terms of the …nal good is given by P wr t P w t Pt .
Retailers and Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of di¤erentiated retail varieties z of mass one-they are indexed z 2 [0; 1] and each one of them is produced by a monopolistically competitive retail …rm. 21 All retail …rms are owned by the households. The retail sector transforms homogeneous wholesale output into di¤erentiated varieties of goods using a linear technology. Each retail variety is then bundled up by …nal goods producers and sold for consumption (to households and entrepreneurs) and for investment (to capital goods producers) purposes.
There is a continuum of mass one of identical …nal goods producers which bundle the retail varieties.
The aggregate bundle of varieties Y t de…nes …nal goods with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties and Y t (z) denotes the amount of each variety z 2 [0; 1]. The corresponding …nal goods price, P t , is given by
, which is a function of the prices of each variety, P t (z). Hence, the optimal allocation of expenditure to each variety z, i.e.,
implies that retailers face a downward-sloping demand function from …nal goods producers.
The retail …rm z then chooses price P t (z) to maximize its expected nominal pro…ts, i.e.,
subject to the demand function in (29) and the intertemporal discounting factor t t t 0
P0
Pt from the households' problem. For each unit of its own variety sold, the retail …rm needs to acquire a unit of the wholesale good at the competitive nominal price P w t to produce it. Retailers can change nominal prices every period but face a Rotemberg (1982) quadratic adjustment cost s p (P t (z) ; P t 1 (z)) given by:
where ' p 0 measures the degree of the price adjustment cost. 22 These costs increase in magnitude with the size of the price change and are proportional to the overall scale of economic activity given by the bundle of varieties Y t . 23 All retailers face the same optimization problem and choose the same price P t (z), and thus, a symmetric equilibrium emerges where P t (z) = P t and Y t (z) = Y t .
By market clearing, the demand of the wholesale good from all retailers has to be equal to the total production of the wholesale …rms-i.e., Y t = Y w t . Hence, we can rewrite the optimal pricing equation from the retailers'problem simply as:
where t Pt Pt 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate, and P wr t P w t Pt is the real marginal cost. The inverse of P wr t can be interpreted as the gross markup of each retail good over the wholesale goods.
Equilibrium in the …nal goods market means the production of the …nal good Y t in each period is allocated to the consumption of households C t , to investment by capital goods producers X t , and to cover the costs associated with adjusting nominal prices in the retail sector and the costs that originate from monitoring and enforcing the optimal loan contract described earlier. This gives rise to the aggregate per-period resource constraint for …nal output:
Loss from price adjustm ent costs
Loss from m onitoring costs :
Monetary Authority
In our model, the monetary authority sets the short-term nominal interest rate, I t , according to a standard Taylor (1993) monetary policy rule with inertia,
where I is the steady-state nominal interest rate, t Pt Pt 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate, t = 1 denotes the target gross in ‡ation rate (which we set to imply zero net in ‡ation), and With m 2 (0; 1), the stochastic process for the monetary policy shock, m t , can be written as:
2 2 For the problem to be well-de…ned, we need to ensure that Bernanke et al. (1999) uses the Calvo (1983) model to introduce price stickiness instead of the Rotemberg (1982) model. The two models are observationally-equivalent whenever approximated up to a …rst-order and around a zero in ‡ation steady state. Ascari and Sbordone (2014) provide a more in-depth review of the di¤erences that emerge between both price-setting models within the New Keynesian framework.
The stochastic volatility, m;t m e b m;t ; is used to capture the source of policy uncertainty. Similarly to the micro-and macro-uncertainty shocks, it evolves according to an AR(1) process: 
Inspecting the Mechanism
Most medium-scale DSGE models such as Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) abstract from capital market imperfections. In turn, models with …nancial frictions such as Bernanke et al. (1999) or, more recently, and Christiano et al. (2014) highlight the importance of the …nancial accelerator's adverse feedback loop mechanism for the transmission of monetary policy for the propagation of shocks-but largely ignore the role of uncertainty over the business cycle and, more speci…cally, of uncertainty about monetary policy. We aim to explore the …nancial accelerator mechanism precisely as it relates to the transmission of uncertainty shocks.
For that, it might be useful to start clarifying the key aspects of the mechanism in a toy version of the model we use in the paper. Under perfect information and costless contract enforcement, the entrepreneur
I t where the nominal rate I t gives us the opportunity costs of the loanable funds obtained from the households (through …nancial intermediation). If E t R e t+1 > I t , then the entrepreneur's demand for funds would be in…nite. Hence, competitive market forces will imply that E t R e t+1 = I t . In other words, under perfect information, asset markets would be complete and the Modigliani-Miller theorem would hold: real investment decisions in that case are independent of the …nancial structure in the model and, to be more precise, they are independent of whether entrepreneurs are equity or debt …nanced.
In the context of the Bernanke et al. (1999) model, private information and limited liability are the key assumptions to break away from complete asset markets and from the implications of the ModiglianiMiller theorem on the indeterminacy of the …nancial structure of entrepreneurs. Private information implies that only entrepreneurs can costlessly observe returns, while lenders must pay a …xed fraction of the realized return interpreted as a monitoring cost. Limited liability on the part of the entrepreneurs, in turn, introduces a lower bound (of zero) on the minimum payo¤ that the entrepreneurs can achieve. As a result, we end up with the following modi…ed e¢ ciency condition to determine the optimal choice of capital in the model as implied by (14) . Combining this with the participation constraint for lenders, we obtain that
It (!t; !;t) f (!t; !;t) (!t; !;t) ;
where the default threshold ! t is increasing in the external risk premium, E t R e t+1
It
, based on the …rst-order conditions from the optimal loan contract for the threshold itself and capital (described in more detail in the Appendix).
From here it follows that It ; !;t is the optimal leverage (asset-equity ratio). Here, the optimal leverage does not depend on …rm-speci…c factors, and this implies that we can aggregate the capital demands across entrepreneurs and think of this as an aggregate relationship where
Nt
Pt is the aggregate real net worth and Q t K t+1 is the aggregate capital demand. Our model incorporates Tobin's q, Q t , as an important asset-pricing channel in the determination of the demand for capital apart from the optimal leverage itself.
Inverting this relationship appropriately, we obtain the e¢ ciency condition in (14), i.e.,
which relates the yields to the strength of the aggregate balance sheet of the …rms where s PtQtKt+1 Nt
is the gross interest rate spread. In equilibrium, the spread will be inversely related to the aggregate balance sheet strength of the entrepreneurs-but also to the micro-uncertainty !;t . We can view !;t as a measure of the dispersion of the idiosyncratic shock ! t and, accordingly, consider the consequences of a mean-preserving increase in the risk spread. Under some conditions, we …nd that the optimal leverage satis…es that
It ; !;t
In other words, increasing the idiosyncratic risk reduces capital demand by tightening the margins and reducing the optimal leverage ratio required.
This is the heart of the mechanism that we explore quantitatively in the remainder of this paper and the heart of our paper's contribution. Christiano et al. (2014) , among others, have recognized the role that risk shocks or shocks to the spread can play in accounting for business cycles. Our theory builds on the existing general equilibrium models with …nancial market imperfections to provide a rationale for (…nancial) risk shocks based on the idea of uncertainty about idiosyncratic shocks-that cannot be fully insured against.
Other forms of aggregate uncertainty-including monetary policy uncertainty, in particular-would only have an additional impact through capital demand on investment and, therefore, over the business cycle to the extent that they feed through asset values (Tobin's q) and their e¤ects on them, or to the extent that they in ‡uence the decisions of households through a real options e¤ect (from …xed costs or partial irreversibility), or through a precautionary savings e¤ect (from risk aversion). Our theory and our subsequent quantitative work suggest that asset market incompleteness is critical not just to pin down the …nancial structure of entrepreneurs but also to explain why idiosyncratic shocks would matter.
Moreover, our paper also makes another important point that-to our knowledge-has not yet received much attention in the literature. What our inspection of the mechanism reveals is that the strength of the balance sheet e¤ects operating through the optimal leverage depends inversely on the uncertainty attached to the idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, and this is what is signi…cant, the endogenous propagation of other shocks through the investment channel described here can be potentially di¤erent depending on whether idiosyncratic shocks are more or less uncertain. In other words, the …nancial accelerator's propagation of shocks is conditional on the amount of microeconomic uncertainty. We …nd that whenever micro-uncertainty !;t is high, the optimal leverage is low and-accordingly-the risk spreads are low as well. In that environment, even conventional monetary policy shocks (as well as any other level shocks) would have a more muted impact on the capital demand resulting in smaller ampli…cation e¤ects on investment and economic activity arising from the …nancial accelerator channel. However, this also implies a lower level of capital.
That is to say, we …nd that greater uncertainty about the idiosyncratic shocks would result in precautionary lower levels of the leverage but would also result in less capital accumulation. We therefore highlight the importance of uncertainty (micro-uncertainty in particular) as a shifter in the propagation dynamics for other …rst-moment and even second-moment shocks.
Solving the Model
The traditional log-linearizing approach is not suitable here because, with a …rst-order approximation of the solution, stochastic volatility would not enter into the decision rules in an interesting way. 24 In order to obtain an independent e¤ect of the stochastic volatility terms, we use a third-order perturbation solution to approximate the general rational expectations solution (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and Aruoba et al. (2006)).
Pruned Third-Order Approximation
The set of equilibrium conditions that characterizes the solution of the model can be written in a compact way as E t f (y t+1 ; y t ; x t+1 ; x t ; t+1 ; t ) = 0;
where E t denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information available at time t, y t is a vector of n y control variables, x t is a vector of n x state variables, and the vector t contains all n structural shocks. The solution to the system given in equation (41) can be written in terms of the following two equations:
where is an n x n variance-covariance matrix of structural shocks and is the perturbation parameter that scales the variance-covariance matrix. 25 We are seeking a higher-order approximation to functions g ( ) and h ( ) around the deterministic steady state where x t = x and = 0.
To be more precise, we seek a third-order approximation. As in Fernández-Villaverde ( (2011), we note that the …rst, second, and third partial derivatives of g ( ) and 2 4 It is worth noting that when considering mean-preserving-spread uncertainty shocks, the time-varying variance shows up in the …rst-order approximation as changes in the mean.
2 5 The additive linear structure of the shocks is not restrictive as we augment the state vector to include the shock terms.
h ( ) with respect to the components of x t as well as the perturbation parameter are used to compute the third-order approximation.
Following Andreasen et al. (2013) , we examine a pruned third-order approximation that eliminates approximation terms of a higher order than three from the impulse responses and other dynamic analysis as these higher order terms can introduce dynamic instability. From Andreasen et al. (2013) , the pruned third-order approximation has the form:
where y rd t are the pruned third-order approximations for the control variables, x f t are state variables based on the …rst-order approximation, x s t are the additional second-order approximation terms for state variables, and x rd t are the additional third-order terms for the state variables. Note that if the …rst order approximation is stationary, then so are the pruned second-order and third-order approximations.
The …rst-order derivatives are: g x (n y n x matrix) and h x (n x n x matrix). The second-order derivatives are: G xx (n y n 2 x matrix), H xx (n x n 2 x matrix), g (n y 1 vector), and h (n x 1 vector). The thirdorder derivatives are: G xxx (n y n 3 x matrix), H xxx (n x n 3 x matrix), g x (n y n x matrix), h x (n y n x matrix), g (n y 1 vector), and h (n x 1 vector). We use Dynare to …nd the second-and third-order perturbation solutions and extract the matrices relevant for the pruned third-order approximation. Table 1 summarizes the model parameters used in our simulations. Since we adopt the set-up of the …nancial accelerator model, our model parameterization is roughly similar to the existing literature based on the seminal work of Bernanke et al. (1999) , except where otherwise noted. We take the estimates of the aggregate productivity (TFP) and the monetary policy stochastic volatility parameters from Born and Pfeifer (2014) who obtain them directly from U.S. data on TFP and the short-term interest rates.
Fitting the Model to the Data
We set the values of nine key parameters ( , b, ' k , ' p , , , ! , ! , and ! ) so as to match simulated moments from the model to values that are consistent with key empirical regularities found in U.S. data and our model parameter normalizations. . the ratio of the variance of investment (400 ln (X t )) to the variance of output (400 ln (Y t )),
7. the …rst-order autocorrelation of the spread,
8. the …rst-order autocorrelation of nondurable consumption (400 ln (C t )),
9. the …rst-order autocorrelation of in ‡ation (400 ln ( t )).
For the mean default probability (100 def ault t ) and mean hours (400 ln (H t )), no sample data was used; the target moments were normalized to 0:75 (Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999)) and zero, respectively. 
and
ln C , and \ ln ( t ) = ln ( t ) ln with Z being the sample mean of the variable Z t . E m o del ( ) is the analytical unconditional mean implied by the pruned third-order approximation while VAR m o del ( ) and m o del ( ) are the simulated unconditional variances and …rst-order autocorrelations implied as the pruned third-order approximation, respectively. Simulated variances and autocorrelations are based on 20; 000 simulated values of the model. For each parameter value evaluated, the same random number seed was used to generated the simulated samples.
Note that our problem is essentially a simulated method of moments estimation except that for two of the moment conditions (the default probability ( def ault t ) and mean hours (ln (H t ))) there is no sampling variation. 27 It turns out that our estimated parameters for , , and ! are quite similar to those in Bernanke et al. (1999) while the parameters for ! and ! are not very far from those used by Christiano et al. (2014) .
Similarly, the parameters for b, ' k , and ' p are well within the ranges typically seen in the literature. 28 Furthermore, we …nd that:
Rather than take the values for , , and ! from Bernanke et al. (1999) , we estimate these parameters that are key to determining the terms of the …nancial contract together with the parameters governing the time-varying dynamics of the dispersion in entrepreneur productivity ( ! and ! ). In our exercise, the dispersion of the idiosyncratic shock is time-varying unlike in the Bernanke et al. (1999) framework, making it all the more relevant that we pin down these parameters to be consistent with the features observed in the data. In this task, we note that the means implied by the model for the risk spread (ln
), the leverage ratio ( Nt PtQtKt+1 ), and the default probability ( We use the variance of investment (X t ) relative to the variance of output (Y t ) as well as the autocorrelations for in ‡ation ( t ) and consumption (C t ) to help determine the values of b, ' k , and ' p . In this sense, we aim to select a parameter ' p that would result in nominal rigidities whose impact on in ‡ation is not too persistent-as suggested by the data.
Finally, one observes that the value of is largely determined by normalizing average log household hours (H t ) to zero. for the data as well as for the di¤erent alternative model speci…cations that we consider. Table 4 shows the autocorrelation of key variables for various model speci…cations. Table 5 displays the correlations of key variables with output and the risk spread for the benchmark as well as the competing model speci…cations.
Main Quantitative Findings

Summary of Business Cycle Statistics
Note that most of these variances and covariances were not used to estimate the model parameters.
Comparing the benchmark model (M 1) with the model without stochastic volatilities (M 2) in Table 3 Table 4 ), with the exception being that in ‡ation persistence is substantially lower when there are no nominal frictions. We argue, therefore, that persistence among the variables of interest is largely una¤ected by key features of the model such as the stochastic volatilities or the presence of frictions (…nancial and in the form of nominal rigidities). We …nd that these same features and frictions play a major role in driving the overall macro volatility of the model with …nancial frictions in particular opening an important conduit for propagation through the funding of capital.
From Table 5 , one observes that the model gets many of the cross-correlations of output with other real macro variables largely right (the most notable exception being the correlation between output and the real wage). Comparing columns M 1 through M 5 suggests that including stochastic volatility does not change the correlations of output with other real macro variables all that much, and it does not change the cross-correlations of output and the risk spread in a substantial way either.
We observe that the standard agency-cost model without stochastic volatility of Bernanke et al. (1999) results in procyclical movements in the external …nance premium (and default probabilities). 29 That is, endogenous movements in credit spreads are not strongly countercyclical. Including time-varying microuncertainty results in a more plausible countercyclical external …nance premium, but even so the model correlations are smaller (in absolute value) than those found in the data. This suggests that the standard model with credit frictions, even one that includes time-varying micro-uncertainty, misses a substantial amount of the interaction between the risk spread and economic activity seen in the data.
Impulse Response Analysis
To assess the model's implications for how the economy responds to shocks in the exogenous driving processes, we would like to conduct something similar to the standard impulse response analysis typically done with linear models. Given the nonlinear nature of the model solution that we pursue here, we use instead the generalized impulse response approach of Koop et al. (1996) and calculate how the conditional expectation of the endogenous variables would change as a result of a shock. Speci…cally, we examine:
where we use the pruned third-order approximation so the state vector can be expressed as x t 1 = ( Typically, researchers will take the initial condition to be a particular realization, say the deterministic steady state or the unconditional mean of the state variables. Unfortunately, while these responses are relatively easy to compute, one is not sure how to evaluate how likely it is that the economy would be at that particular initial state. Our approach is to use the information not only in the unconditional mean, but also in the unconditional distribution implied by the model to help choose initial conditions for the impulse response analysis that are economically relevant for our analysis. 
Unconditional (or Average) Impulse Responses
As part of our analysis, we would like to get a sense of the average e¤ect of shocks over all possible initial conditions. In other words, we are interested in the expected (or average) impulse response given the unconditional distribution implied by the model, i.e.,
where p(x) is the unconditional density of the state vector x implied by the model, k is the endogenous variable of interest, and t refers to the shock innovations that we are evaluating. To obtain an estimate of the unconditional distribution of the endogenous variables implied by the model, we simulate the pruned model, starting at the unconditional mean for 300 time periods. We do this 20; 000 times to get an estimate of the unconditional distribution. We then draw a sample of initial conditions (500 draws), calculate the change in conditional expectations for each initial condition, and then average the responses. Aggregate uncertainty shocks have some precautionary saving e¤ects (causing consumption to fall, hours and 3 0 We use the analytical solution for the impulse response functions based on Andreasen et al. (2013) to calculate the change in conditional expectations.
3 1 Balke et al. (2017) provide a very detailed exploration of the model under the most relevant initial conditions. We also report multiple other results aimed at exploring the potential asymmetries of the model and the e¤ects of the size of the shocks on the propagation that complement the results included in the paper. That detailed exploration cannot be included in the current draft due to length constraints, naturally.
3 2 Balke et al. (2017) includes a …gure that compares the average (over the unconditional distribution of initial conditions) impulse responses with the impulse responses with an initial condition equal to the unconditional means. The two sets of responses are qualitatively similar, but the average response to interest rate shocks is larger in magnitude than the corresponding response starting at the unconditional mean. output to rise) but these e¤ects are relatively small.
The e¤ects of aggregate uncertainty shocks on the risk spread as well as on the price of capital and nominal interest rate are also negligible. This result seems to be consistent with the literature. In both Born and Pfeifer (2014) and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) , most of the individual stochastic volatility shocks had small e¤ects. In fact, when examining the importance of stochastic volatility shocks, both papers display the response to a simultaneous two standard deviation shock to all sources of uncertainty aiming to represent events of heightened uncertainty (albeit events that occur very infrequently).
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In contrast, in our baseline model, micro-uncertainty shocks have sizeable …rst-order e¤ects. A meanpreserving spread shock to the distribution of entrepreneur productivity has e¤ects of similar magnitude as shocks to TFP and monetary policy. The e¤ect of a micro-uncertainty shock is strongly negative on output, investment, hours, and the price of capital while strongly positive on the risk spread.
In the agency-cost model that underpins the …nancial accelerator in our model, credit markets are incomplete and idiosyncratic technology shocks cannot be fully insured due to information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. Hence, greater micro-uncertainty results in a higher required external …nance premium because it makes lending to entrepreneurs more risky and leads to a higher default probability as well. The high cost of borrowing discourages investment, pushes up the price of capital, and encourages entrepreneurs to free up more internal funds. In response to the falling investment, households increase consumption and cut down labor input. As a result, output shrinks.
To see how di¤erent features of the model a¤ect the unconditional impulse responses, Figure 2 plots the average impulse responses of output, the spread, and the interest rate for alternative models. We observe that:
In one of our experiments, we increase the curvature of the utility function by increasing from one to seven in the baseline model, making households both more risk averse and less willing to substitute consumption (net of habits) over time. This increases the responses of output, spreads, and interest rates to TFP uncertainty and monetary policy uncertainty shocks. This is perhaps not too surprising as greater risk aversion increases the precautionary saving in the face of an increase in uncertaintyhence, the greater increase in output. Nonetheless, the e¤ects of aggregate uncertainty shocks (related to TFP or monetary policy) are still rather small. For other …rst-order moment shocks, higher values of typically dampen the e¤ects of the shocks.
If prices were perfectly ‡exible (' p = 0), the e¤ect of the aggregate uncertainty shocks, already small in the benchmark model, virtually disappears. This suggests that price stickiness does magnify the e¤ects of aggregate uncertainty shocks. In contrast, price ‡exibility lessens the e¤ect of micro-uncertainty shocks while increasing the e¤ect of TFP shocks on output.
Comparing the baseline model with a model where the …nancial frictions are not present ( = 0), we see that the presence of …nancial frictions does not qualitatively change the average response of the variables to …rst-order moment shocks. The stochastic volatility shocks related to TFP and monetary policy appear to have modest e¤ects anyway, and the removal of the …nancial accelerator channel for propagation does not appear to alter this …nding of our model all that much. The lone exception in all of this is, of course, the micro-uncertainty shocks which have no e¤ects when there are no …nancial frictions.
-Recall that the micro-uncertainty shocks represent a mean-preserving increase in the dispersion of the distribution of entrepreneurial idiosyncratic productivity. Although economic agents cannot insure themselves against aggregate shocks (systematic risk), a complete asset market would allow for perfect risk-sharing and therefore full insurance against idiosyncratic technology shocks. The no-…nancial-friction model approximates such a complete asset markets allocation by making monitoring costless and, hence, only uninsurable aggregate shocks (such as TFP uncertainty and monetary policy uncertainty) have an e¤ect. Insurable idiosyncratic technology shocks (such as micro-uncertainty) do not.
-As for the other stochastic volatility shocks, the responses are larger in some cases when the …nancial frictions are present (TFP uncertainty), but slightly smaller in other cases (TFP shocks, monetary policy shocks, and monetary uncertainty shocks).
As noted above, in general, shocks in nonlinear models do not scale up as in the linear case nor do they imply symmetric responses to positive and negative shocks. 
Conditional Impulse Responses
Thus far, we have examined the average e¤ect of shocks on key variables in our model. However, as pointed out above, in a nonlinear model the e¤ect of shocks depends on the initial state of the economy at the time of the shock. It is interesting to discern how and to what extent the response to a shock di¤ers depending on the state of the economy. For example, do shocks have di¤erent e¤ects when credit frictions are large as opposed to when they are small? 35 To get at this notion of conditional responses, we consider impulse responses de…ned by:
where p (xjy = y 0 ) is the conditional density of the vector of states x implied by the model when variable y is initially at y 0 . That is, given that a variable y is initially at y 0 , we average over the possible states consistent with this initial condition.
As we are interested in the interaction of credit conditions and shocks, we …rst consider impulse response analysis in which the initial state corresponds to states where the level of the risk spread is either high or low. With credit frictions in the Bernanke et al. (1999) model, the expected costs of monitoring defaulting entrepreneurs are priced in the spreads that lenders charge on their loans. In this sense, spreads re ‡ect the extent to which credit frictions and entrepreneur risk are present and, thus, instances where the spread is high are thought to coincide with instances in which credit frictions are large. Speci…cally, we take high spread initial states to be states where the spread is roughly equal to the 95 th percentile of its unconditional distribution and low spread initial states to be states where the spread is at the 5 th percentile.
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Our key results can be summarized as follows: Figure 4 displays the response of output to the …ve structural shocks conditional on the spread being either high (approximately 95 th percentile) or low (approximately 5 th percentile). The e¤ect of TFP shocks turns out to be slightly smaller if the spread is initially high. That is, if credit frictions are already large, the expansionary e¤ect of a TFP shock is muted somewhat. For a shock to monetary policy, the opposite is true. If the spread is initially high, the e¤ect of a contractionary monetary shock is larger. Similarly, the contractionary e¤ect on output of an increase in micro-uncertainty when the spread is initially high is about 40% larger than when the spread is initially low. This suggests that if current credit conditions are poor (high spreads), then the e¤ect of supply-side shocks (TFP) tends to get dampened while the e¤ect of …nancing shocks (monetary policy and micro-uncertainty) gets magni…ed. In turn, the e¤ect of both TFP uncertainty and monetary policy uncertainty shocks does not depend on the current state of credit conditions-the responses are virtually identical and very small regardless of whether the spread was initially high or low. Figure 5 displays the response of the spread itself to various shocks conditional on whether the spread was initially high or low. The positive response of the spread to TFP, monetary policy, and microuncertainty shocks is even larger when the spread is already high. This is particularly the case for micro-uncertainty shocks-the e¤ect on the risk spread of a positive micro-uncertainty shock is nearly twice as large when the spread is initially high as opposed to when the spread is initially small.
What leads to high or low levels of the risk spread? The unconditional impulse responses displayed in Figure 1 suggest that high or low spreads are likely the result of cumulative shocks to micro-uncertainty.
To get a more precise sense of which shocks contribute more to high or low risk spreads, Figure 6 
Discussion
We obtain relatively small e¤ects from ‡uctuations in aggregate uncertainty (modeled as stochastic volatility in TFP and monetary policy). Aside from implying that macro shocks are on average larger in magnitude when aggregate uncertainty is high, this type of uncertainty is of second-order importance in the baseline model. Increasing risk aversion increases the e¤ects of these uncertainty shocks, but they are still relatively small compared to shocks that a¤ect the level of TFP or monetary policy directly.
Why are the macro-and policy-uncertainty e¤ects relatively small? It is because the primary e¤ect of aggregate uncertainty in our model appears to work through the precautionary saving motive which is generally modest. Even though we have adjustment costs for changing the prices and the capital stock, the option value of waiting when making decisions that are costly to undo still doesn't appear to have large quantitative e¤ects.
Another way to think about why uncertainty has relatively small e¤ects is there is simply not a lot of curvature in the model. The standard neoclassical medium-size DSGE model-and even the New Keynesian variant that we consider here-is not that far from being log-linear, and the addition of quadratic adjustment costs for price changes and capital does not add much more nonlinear structure. As the time-varying stochastic volatility shows up in the higher order (3 rd and above) approximation terms, the lack of substantial nonlinearities in the neighborhood of the deterministic steady state means these higher-order terms are relatively small. Perhaps, additional adjustment costs such as the costs of changing labor input might provide greater avenues for uncertainty to matter. Alternatively, adding additional sources of uncertainty might increase the quantitative in ‡uence of aggregate uncertainty. However, given the results of Born and Pfeifer (2014) , other forms of uncertainty (such as on taxes) are not likely to have large e¤ects either.
In contrast, we …nd that micro-uncertainty is important both qualitatively and quantitatively in our analysis-we would say of …rst-order importance. It is not the micro-uncertainty in and of itself that matters, but the fact that this form of uncertainty exacerbates the credit frictions that arise because of asymmetric information. In our benchmark model, taking away the credit frictions kills the …nancial accelerator channel and removes any role that micro-uncertainty can play on economic activity. If there are other frictions that are related to micro-uncertainty (e.g., …rm hiring decisions or …rm-speci…c adjustment costs), then increases in micro-uncertainty could have an additional e¤ect independent of credit frictions.
While micro-uncertainty and credit frictions interact with one another, the interactions between aggregate uncertainty variables and credit frictions are relatively small. The e¤ects of aggregate uncertainty shocks do not depend on the current credit conditions, nor does the e¤ect of a credit friction shock (micro-uncertainty) depend signi…cantly on current aggregate uncertainty (neither related to TFP nor to monetary policy). In fact, as suggested above, spread ‡uctuations appear to be driven primarily by exogenous shocks in microuncertainty ( Figure 6 ). All the macro (TFP and monetary policy) shocks including to the level and to uncertainty have relatively small e¤ects on the spread.
What accounts for the minimal interaction between credit frictions and the macro shocks? The only way for macroeconomic conditions to a¤ect the spread is through their e¤ect on the leverage ratio ( Nt=Pt QtKt+1 ). It turns out that while macro shocks can have a large e¤ect on individual components of the leverage ratio, these a¤ect the numerator and denominator of the leverage ratio roughly in the same proportion (through their e¤ect on the price of capital). As a result, the leverage ratio moves very little which in turn implies a small response by the spread. Consequently, only changes in the exogenous micro-uncertainty have substantial e¤ects on the spread and the extent of credit frictions.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we examined the interaction between aggregate uncertainty and credit frictions through the lens of a New Keynesian DSGE model with stochastic volatility and credit frictions arising from asymmetric information (as in Bernanke et al. (1999) ). We use a pruned third order approximation to solve the model, calculate various business cycle moments implied by the model, and conduct impulse response analysis. We …nd that the interaction between aggregate uncertainty and the extent of the credit frictions (as measured by the risk spread) is relatively small. While micro-uncertainty (or equivalently, exogenous credit friction shocks) have …rst-order e¤ects that are of comparable magnitudes as shocks to the level of TFP or monetary policy shocks, macro-uncertainty and policy uncertainty shocks have relatively small e¤ects. Our nonlinear impulse response analysis suggests that the e¤ect of an increase in micro-uncertainty tends to be larger as the existing risk spread is higher (indicating a worsening credit condition). On the other hand, conditioning on the amount of TFP or monetary uncertainty has virtually no qualitative impact on the responses to shocks in the model aside from the fact that shocks tend to be larger when uncertainty is high.
In our model (and in the Bernanke et al. (1999) model as well) the leverage ratio and, hence, the risk spread move very little in response to most shocks. The exception is micro-uncertainty shocks which have a direct e¤ect on the spread independent of the leverage ratio. Perhaps, incorporating longer-term contracts might increase the e¤ect of aggregate uncertainty, particularly if contracts are set in nominal terms. Furthermore, in the model, net worth is largely a¤ected by the price of capital (Q t ); how large ‡uctuations in the price of capital depends, in turn, largely on the adjustment costs of changing capital.
Adding a stronger asset price channel might generate greater ‡uctuations in net worth and larger ‡uctuations in the risk spread.
A Optimal Loan Contract
On the Aggregate Sharing of Nominal Income from Capital. At time t, the nominal income from capital net of borrowing costs at time t + 1 anticipated by the entrepreneurs for each possible state of aggregate risk-where aggregate risk arises from productivity (TFP) shocks, monetary shocks, and from the stochastic volatility on the aggregate productivity (TFP), monetary, and idiosyncratic technology shockscan be calculated as follows:
By the law of large numbers, f (! t ; !;t ) can be interpreted as the fraction of the expected nominal income from capital obtained by the entrepreneurs.
Similarly, the nominal income from capital net of monitoring costs at time t + 1 anticipated by the …nancial intermediaries at each possible state of aggregate risk is equal to:
(1 )
where g (! t ; !;t ) (1 )
By the law of large numbers, g (! t ; !;t ) can be interpreted as the fraction of the expected nominal capital income that accrues to the …nancial intermediaries.
Based on these de…nitions, the sharing rule on nominal income from capital implied by the loan contract satis…es that:
where G (! t ; !;t ) characterizes the losses due to monitoring of defaulting entrepreneurs, i.e.,
As can be inferred from equation (55), the nominal income from capital split between entrepreneurs (f (! t ; !;t )) and …nancial intermediaries (g (! t ; !;t )) does not add up to one. The fraction, G (! t ; !;t ), is lost due to defaults and the costs of monitoring them. The income shares for the entrepreneurs and the …nancial intermediaries as well as the costly monitoring losses depend on the default threshold, ! t , but also on the realization of the micro-uncertainty shock, !;t .
The Contracting Problem. With the information available at time t, the entrepreneurs'expected nominal income from capital net of borrowing costs implied by equation (51) is:
Similarly, …nancial intermediaries' expected nominal income from capital net of monitoring costs given by equation (53) is:
The formal contracting problem, at time t, reduces to choosing the quantity of capital, K t+1 , and the default threshold, ! t , that maximize the entrepreneurs'expected nominal income from capital net of borrowing costs given by (57) subject to the following participation constraint for the …nancial intermediaries, i.e.,
where the left-hand side combines the expected nominal income from capital of the …nancial intermediaries in (58) with the sharing rule equation in (55), and the equality on the right-hand side follows from the balance sheet equation of the entrepreneurs (i.e., from P t Q t K t+1 = N t + L t ). All …nancial intermediaries share equally in the pool of loans to entrepreneurs. If lenders participate in this loan contract, they always supply enough loans, L t , as long as they achieve a rate of return on their loan portfolio greater than or equal to the nominal interest rate, I t . In other words, we do not explicitly consider here the possibility of credit rationing.
It follows from the …rst-order condition with respect to ! t that:
where (! t ; !;t ) is the Lagrange multiplier on the …nancial intermediaries'participation constraint in (59).
Here, we de…ne f ! (! t ; !;t )
. By virtue of this optimality condition, we say that the shadow cost of enticing the participation of the …nancial intermediaries in this loan contract is given by:
This, in turn, implies that the participation constraint must always be binding since the Lagrange multiplier is non-zero. The binding participation constraint can be re-written as:
or, more compactly, as
where (! t ; !;t ) is
given the nominal income split rule in (55).
The contracting problem also requires the following …rst-order condition with respect to capital, K t+1 , to hold:
where we implicitly are conjecturing that ! t is conditioned only on variables known at time t (to be more precise, we conjecture that ! t is conditioned on PtQtKt+1 Nt ; !;t ). 38 Simply re-arranging this expression gives us that,
This optimality condition determines the excess returns per unit of capital above the nominal interest rate that are required to make the loan contract worthwhile to both entrepreneurs and …nancial intermediaries.
If we combine equations (63) and (66), then it follows that:
(!t; !;t) f (!t; !;t) (!t; !;t) = 1 1 (!t; !;t) f (!t; !;t) (!t; !;t)
which validates our conjecture that the default threshold ! t is a function of observables implying that
; !;t . Given the relationships derived in (66) and (67), a formulation of the external …nance premium arises as follows:
or simply
given that I t is known at time t and can be taken out of the expectation. This characterization of the external …nance premium expands the Bernanke et al. (1999) …nancial accelerator framework by modelling nominal contracts explicitly and by linking the premium itself to the micro-uncertainty shocks, !;t . 
